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Abstract 
Bayesian networks provide a probabilistic seman­
tics for qualitative assertions about likelihood. A 
qualitative reasoner based on an algebra over these 
assertions can derive further conclusions about the 
influence of actions. While the conclusions are 
much weaker than those computed from complete 
probability distributions, they are still valuable for 
suggesting potential actions, eliminating obviously 
inferior plans, identifying important tradeoffs, and 
explaining probabilistic models. 
1 Introduction 
In the traditional planning paradigm, the effects of 
actions·are represented as logical functions of the 
state in which they are applied. In practice, the 
representation is restricted by difficulties of expres­
sion and deductive limits of the reasoner. When 
the planner's knowledge of the environment is un­
certain, the representation problem is substantially 
more complicated. Because the result of an action 
is not uniquely determined by the model, it is nec­
essary to enumerate the set of possible results that 
can obtain along with their respective likelihoods. 
One class of representations is the probabilistic 
model. Probabilistic models have the virtue of 
completeness; the output is a full distribution of 
outcomes for any plan of interest. Furthermore, 
the model has a decision-theoretic semantics that 
can be used to validate and interpret its compo­
nent parts. However, opponents of this approach 
'This research was supported by National Institutes of 
Health Grant No. ROl LM04493 from the National Library 
of Medicine and National Institutes of Health Grant No. 
R24 RR01320 from the Division of Reeea.rch Resources. 
argue that the completeness and semantic ade­
quacy are an illusion, since structurally correct and 
numerically precise models cannot be constructed 
in practice. New uncertainty calculi and various 
deterministic approaches to uncertainty have been 
proposed as alternate methodologies. 
The approach described here attempts to an­
swer some of the concerns of non-probabilists with­
out abandoning probabilistic semantics. Essential 
characteristics of the influence of actions on the 
world can ohen be captured with qualitative asser­
tions that are much easier to specify than complete 
probabilistic models. Conclusions derived from 
· qualitative abstractions can be justified by deci­
sion theory, with the added assurance that they 
are not an artifact of unreasonable precision in 
our specification of the model. Of course, such 
conclusions will be weaker than those drawn from 
completely specified models, and are not sufficient 
in general to select a uniquely optimal plan. Nev­
ertheless, qualitative models will often reduce the 
space of admissible plans, help to focus the search 
for good plans, identify central tradeoffs in the de­
cision problem, and improve explainability. 
2 Probabilistic Networks 
Two related graph-based formalisms that have 
been advocated for computer representation of 
probabilistic knowledge are Pearl's Bayesian net· 
works [9] and the influence diagrams of Howard 
and Matheson [6]. Graph representations are com­
putationally attractive and have conceptual advan­
tages in their focus on dependencies among the 
probabilistic variables [10]. 
Bayesian networks and influence diagrams both 
encode probabilistic models as directed graphs, 
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with the nodes representing uncertain variables 
and the links denoting probabilistic dependence. 
Within each node is a table recording the distri­
bution of the node's values given each combination 
of values for its direct predecessor nodes. Distribu­
tions of nodes of interest under various scenarios 
or decisions may be computed through propaga­
tion or graph reduction techniques. Influence di­
agrams also include specially-designated decision 
nodes and informational links to indicate which 
chance variables are known at the time decisions 
are made. A single value node indicates the utility 
of outcomes represented in the network. 
Because decision-making is the focus of this 
work, I will discuss the methodology within the 
influence diagram paradigm. The presentation 
of manipulation techniques below closely parallels 
Shachter's description of the algorithm for evalu­
ating numeric influence diagrams [12]. 
3 Qualitative Influences 
3.1 Definitions 
Qualitative probabilistic networks replace the con­
ditional distribution table within each node with 
a specification of the direction of a predecessor's 
influence. Consider an influence diagram with bi­
nary chance nodes. 1 Lowercase letters are vari­
ables corresponding to each node, and uppercase 
letters are literals denoting the proposition's truth 
or falsity (e.g., A and A.). Often the literal X serves 
as an abbreviation for the proposition x = X. 
We say that node a positively influences node b­
denoted J+(a, b)-if and only if 
Vx Pr(B!Ax) � Pr(B!A.x) (1) 
Equivalently, 
Vx Pr(B!Ax) :::; Pr(B!Ax) (2) 
Here, x ranges over the propositional formulas con­
sistent with both A and A. Negative and zero 
influences are defined analogously. An unknown 
dependence between a and b is written J?(a,b). 
1 The extension to multi-valued chance varb.bles is 
straig.htforward. 
It is also useful to provide a notation for condi­
tional influence assertions. We can assert that a 
positively influences b given y: 
r+(a, b, y):: Vx Pr(BiAyx) � Pr(B!Ayx) (3) 
Such an assertion says nothing about a's influence 
on b when y does not hold. Notice that uncondi­
tional influence is just a special case of conditional 
influence where y =true. 
These influences can be depicted graphically by 
placing the appropriate direction notation on the 
links between nodes. Figure 1 displays a fragment 
of a qualitative probabilistic network consisting of 
one node influenced by several others. Conditional 
influences are indicated by writing the condition 
aft�r the direction, separated by a vertical bar. A 
link may contain several influences, but the condi­
tions for each must be mutually exclusive. 
+lA 
-I� 
Figure 1: Graphical notation for qualitative influ­
ences. 
Assertion of qualitative influences is far weaker 
than the conditional distribution table specified for 
complete influence diagrams. In general, the influ­
ences acting on a node induce a partial order on the 
conditional probabilities for the node's event given 
its predecessors. For example, in the diagram 
of F igure 1, the assertions imply Pr(DIABC) � 
Pr(DIABC). The partial order determined by the 
influences in this case is shown in Figure 2. 
This partial order could be further constrained· 
by assertions of pairwise influence. For example, 
we might assert that for any x, Pr(D\ABx) � 
Pr( DIABx). Joint influence assertions are not con­
sidered here, but the techniques can be extended 
to accommodate them. 
Influences on the value node of an influence di­
agram are defined in a similar manner. The asser­
tion J+ (a, u, y) means that node a has a positive 
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Figure 2: Partial order on the conditional proba­
bilities for D given a, b, and c. An arrow from z 
to y indicates that Pr(D/z) �. Pr(D/y). 
influence on utility u given y. 
J+(a, u, y) := Vz u(z, A, y) � u(x, A, y) (4) 
where z is an assignment of values to nodes other 
than CJ and those in y. J+(u,a,y) is undefined. 
3.2 Graph Manipulations 
Like numeric influence diagrams, qualitative influ­
en�.;e diagrams are "evaluated" by successive re­
moval · of nodes from the network. Any chance 
node with a single direct successor may be removed 
by "splicing" its direct pr:edecessors to its succes­
sor, determining appropriate influences for the new 
links. These new influences can be computed from 
the influences on the old links according to a simple 
qualitative algebra. The operations for combining 
influences are similar to those for combining quali­
tative measures in other applications of qualitative 
reasoning in AI (e.g. see Kuipers [7]). 
Influence Chains 
Consider the simple chain shown in Figure 3. If 
there are no other influences in the network on b or 
c, then it is clear that J+(a, b)AJ+(b, c):::> J+(a, c). 
+ 
Figure 3: A simple influence chain. 
To verify that this also holds if there are other 
influences on b and c (possibly including additional 
indirect paths from a to c) , see Figure 4. 
It is convenient to define an operator, ®, for 
combining chains of qualitative influences. The 
complete definition for ® is provided in Table 1. 
It is apparent from the table that ® is just sign 
Let zo be any assignment of values to the other nodes in the network . We have 
Pr(CIAzo) = Pr(BC!Azo) + Pr(8C/Azo) 
= Pr(C/ABzo) Pr(B/Azo) + Pr(CIABzo) Pr(B/Azo) 
Because a and c are conditionally independent given band :r, 
Pr(CjAzo) = Pr(C(Bzo) Pr(B(Azo) + Pr(C!�:ro) Pr(B!Azo) 
and using Pr(BJAz) + Pr(.9JAz) = 1, 
Pr(CJAzo) = Pr(B!Azo) (Pr(CJBzo)- Pr(CJlho)] + Pr(C(.fbo) 
Similarly, 
Pr(CjAzo) = Pr(B/Azo) (Pr(CJB:ro)- Pr(C/Bzo)] + Pr(CIBzo) 
Given the inequalities expressed by the influence assertions, 
"fz Pr(CIBz) � Pr(CIB:r) and Vz Pr(BIA:r) � Pr(BIA:z:) 
it foUows that Pr(CIA:z:o) � Pr(C/Azo). Since zo was chosen arbitrarily, we have J+(a, c) . I 
Figure 4: A demonstration that J+ ® J+ = J+. 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
multiplication with conjunction of the condition­
ing propositions . Combination of influences is thus 
associative and commutative. 
® � 0 ? 
+ + 0 ? 
+ 0 ? 
0 0 0 0 0 
"? ? ? 0 ? 
Table 1: The ® operator for combining influence 
chains. For example, [+lz ® rill = r-lzAI/. 
Influence Addition 
The derivation above assumed that there were no 
direct links between a and c.2 But even if tbere are 
such links, it sti11 makes sense to say that a posi­
tively influences c along thi1 particulaf' pat/a. After 
removing node b, however, we are left with two di­
rect links from a to c. This situation is illustrated 
in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Removing node b leaves two paths from 
a to c. 
Parallel influences can be combined in a way 
analogous to the serial inftuence chains described 
above. The influence addition operator, $, is de­
fined by Table 2. Note that the ·situation of Fig­
ure 5 is ambiguous; we cannot determine the di­
rection of the overall influence of a on c. 
2If there were, then the condition�! independence :15· 
�umption necese<\ry for going from equa.tic•n (5) to equa­
tion (6) would not be va.lid. 
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$ + 0 ? 
+ + ? + ? 
? ? 
0 + 0 ? 
? ? ? ? ? 
Table 2: The e operator for combining parallel 
influences. 
Arc Reversal 
Shachter [12j shows that during influence diagram 
evaluation there is always a candidate node for re­
moval, sometimes requiring' arc reversals first. It 
is possible to reverse arcs in a qualitative network 
as well, with similar requirements for updating the 
predecessor relations for the nodes involved. The 
reversed influence has the same direction as the 
original one, and each node adds the direct prede­
cessors of the other to its own. New predecessor 
influences are computed from the old values. · 
Decision Nodes 
Decision nodes may be removed from the network 
if the optimal choice is apparent from the influ­
ences in the reduced diagram. For example, if the 
decision node is an unambiguous positive or neg­
ative influence on utility, then the choice is ob­
vious. Given particular values for the informa­
tional predecessors, the decision can be determined 
if the conditional influence of the decision on util­
ity given those values is unambiguous. 
In general, decision nodes cannot be easily re­
moved. Such cases require more powerful analysis 
techniques, like those illustrated below. 
4 An Example: The Generic 
Test /Treat Decision 
Consider the following rather vague description of 
a medical decision problem: 
Patient P might have the undesirable dis­
ease D. Patients with D are sometimes 
"cured," which is preferred over uncured 
disease. A treatment exists which im­
proves the likelihood that P will be cured, 
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but this treatment may result in unpleasc 
ant side·effects. There is also a test for 
which a positive result is somewhat in· 
dica.ti ve of disease D. The test carries 
some risk of undesirable complications. 
The information presented thus far is obviously 
insufficient for deciding the fate of poor patient P. 
Nevertheless, it conveys enough of the structure of 
the decision problem to construct the qualitative 
influence diagram depicted in Figure 6. 
As the diagram indicates, utility (the hexagon 
node) is a function of the four variables c, d, y, and 
z. The result is conditionally independent of the 
decisions (square nodes) and the test result given 
those four values. Note that cure only influences 
utility in the presence of disease. 
The influence of the test re!ult on the likelihood 
vf disease is similarly conditioned on whether or 
not the test was performed. Because of this condi­
tioning, node d depends probabilistically on node 
t. But since this dependence is totally described 
by the condition on the r influence , we do not need 
a separate influence for t. The dependence is in­
dicated on the diagram by a dashed line to avoid 
portraying a redundant influence in the network. 
The first step in evaluating the diagram is to 
apply the graph manipulations described in sec­
tion 3.2 to reduce the mode) as much as possible. 
In our example , removing nodes c, z, and y and 
reversing the influence between r and d leaves us 
with the diagram of Figure 7. 
Figure 7: The reduced influence diagram. 
4.1 Planning 
Before proceeding further, let us consider our ob­
jectives in this decision problem. We are certainly 
not going to derive a unique decision from this in­
formation. Instead, an analysis of the model serves 
two main purposes: to separate the sensible plans 
from the senseless ones and to identify the indeter­
minacies of the model which are most important 
for resolving the decision at hand. The remainder 
of this discussion is devoted to the first purpose. 
A naive planning program or influence diagram 
evaluator considers all syntactically valid plans. 
In a representation that consists of a collection 
of available actions, the set of syntactically valid 
plans is simply all sequences pf actions. If there are 
uncertain variables that may become known along 
the way, then plans must include contingencies . 
In the reduced diagram of Figure ·7, the set of 
syntactically valid plans is defined by the combi­
nations of t and z, with z expressed as policies 
given t and r. This makes for a total of eight dis-
Figure 6: Qualitative influence diagram for the generic test/treat decision. 
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tinct strategies. While many of these combinations 
are reasonable, others (more than half) either vi­
olate common sense or are not coherent plans at 
all. For example, the combination of T with the 
treatment policy x(r) = X seems like a ridiculous 
strategy, because we are performing the test but 
then treating the patient regardless of the result. 
The strategy of not doing the test but treating only 
if positive is also syntactically valid in this model, 
though it has no coherent meaning in the domain. 
In the following section we will see that-=-at least 
in this example-the intuitively nonsensical plans 
correspond exactly to those not admissible under 
qualitative influences. 
4.2 Determining Admissibility 
A variety of techniques are available for comput­
ing admissibility within a qualitative probabilis­
tic network. This section explores a few of these 
by examining their conclusions about the generic 
test/treat example. 
Hypothetical Optimality 
The "hypothetical optimality" technique explores 
the space of possible plans by postulating that the 
optimal strategy includes particular components. 
For example, we might start on the current prob­
lem by assuming that the best plan includes a test 
operation ( t = T). Examining the diagram of Fig­
ure 7, we see that node t has two paths to the 
value node: an unambiguously negative path due 
to the effect of test complications, and an indeter­
minate path which includes the informational link 
from the test result to the treatment decision. 
If testing is indeed optimal, then the indetermi­
nate path must actually have a positive influence 
on utility. Otherwise, performing the test would 
have an overall negative value. An informational 
path can only have positive value if a downstream 
decision depends on the value of a chance node. 
That is, the value of x which is preferred given R 
is not the preferred value given ll. Thus, one of 
the following two conditions must hold: 
1+ ( x, u, T R) 1\ r ( x, u, T ll) (to) 
r (:t, u, T R) 1\ r+"(x, u, TR) (11) 
The second conjunct of condition ( 11) implies that 
negatives should be treated. But since Pr( Dj R) 2 
Pr(DIR), this clause contradicts the first. Thus, 
given that testing is optimal, the strategy of treat­
ing only the positives is best. 
Similar hypothetical reasoning can show that if 
treating negatives is optimal then it does not make 
sense to perform the test. Proofs of this type rule 
out all strategies in this example except 
• no test, no treatment 
• test, treat if positive 
• no te�t, treat (empiric therapy) 
_ Stochastic Dominance 
Though the previous technique has substantial in­
tuitive appeal. it is not clear that such nice admis­
sibility results can always be derived via simple 
inspection. Therefore, we seek a more systematic 
approach that will eliminate as many nonsensical 
"strategies as possible. 
Figure 8 displays the partial order on utility in­
duced by the influences in the reduced influence 
diagram. We can use this partial ordering to prove 
strategies inadmissible through a generalized form 
of first-order stochastic dominance [15]. Strategy 
A dominates strategy B in the first order if for ev­
ery possible outcome. the likelihood of getting that 
outcome or a. worse one is greater for B than for A. 
This can be generalized to partially ordered out­
comes by requiring that the condition hold within 
directed paths in the order graph, being careful to 
avoid double-counting of outcomes. 
DXT 
- / "'--
OXT DXT 
'-oxT" 
DXT 
l 
DXT 
-
DXT 
1 
DXT 
Figure 8: Partial order on outcome desirability de­
termined from the diagram. 
We can rule out a particular strategy by finding 
another feasible strategy that dominates it accord­
ing to this criterion. To perform this comparison, 
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we determine the outcomes of each strategy given 
the various possibilities for relevant chance nodes 
in the network. For example, Table 3 is a case 
analysis of the two syntactically valid strategies 
"no test, no treat" and "test, no treat." 
Strategy I Case/ Prob Outcome 
t = 1', x=X I 
I 
t = T, x=X I 
D Pr(D) DXT 
lJ Pr(lJ) Dxt 
D Pr(D) DXT 
-
D j Pr(lJ) \ DXT 
Table 3: Case analysis of two strategies. 
The table records the outcome for each case, 
along with its probability (symbolic). Notice that 
the value of node r is irrelevant here, since there is 
no path to utility except through an informational 
link which is not being used. Looking at Table 3, 
it is easy to see that the first strategy dominates 
the second. For each case, the first strategy has an 
outcome which is preferred (based on the partial 
order) to the corresponding outcome in the second 
strategy, which occurs with equal probability. This 
ranking does not depend at all on the prevalence 
of the disease. 
By an almost identical argument, the strategy 
"test, treat" is dominated by the empiric therapy 
strategy. 
Unfortunately, pairwise dominance testing is not 
sufficient to rule out all inadmissible strategies. In 
our example, the strategy "test, treat iff negative" 
is not dominated by any of the other strategies un­
der consideration. While the strategy of treating 
only the positives may seem to make more sense, 
it is actually the inferior choice when, for exam­
ple, the test is very insensitive and the treatment 
complications are relatively unlikely or benign. 
To prove that treating the negatives is a subop­
timal policy, it is necessary to show that there is 
always some strategy that is preferred, though the 
superior strategy may vary from case to case. In 
the scenario mentioned above where this policy is 
better than treating the positives, it is clear that 
there are other strategies that would be even bet-
ter. Indeed, this is always the case in our example. 
For this kind of situation, dominance proofs take 
the form 
(12) 
When (12) holds, we say that 51 is dominated with 
respect to 52 and 53. 
Three-way (or k-way) dominance proofs are 
more cumbersome to construct, however. A tech­
nique that might be computationally more direct is 
to demonstrate suboptimality by comparison with 
mixed strategies [4]. A mixed strategy is simply a 
probabilistic combination of feasible deterministic 
strategies. For our example, consider 
Strategy 9: No test, treat if heads on 
an o coin flip. 
It can be shown that strategy 9 with o = Pr(RID) 
is guaranteed to dominate the treat on negative 
strategy, even though no nonrandom strategy is 
always superior. Since mixed strategies are always 
suboptimal [11], our problematic strategy of treat­
ing only the negatives may be ruled inadmissible. 
5 Conclusions 
Within a probabilistic network formalism, we can 
provide a. precise probabilistic semantics for qual­
itative influences among uncertain variables. A 
qualitative algebra for combining influences in the 
network can be used within an algorithm for iso­
lating the influences of interest, such as the overall 
influence of decisions on expected utility. 
Given a reduced influence diagram, several tech­
niques are available for determining the admissi­
ble strategies among the syntactically valid plans. 
The source of indeterminacy in a failed dominance 
proof may be a reliable indicator of the impor­
tance of further information and assumptions to a 
problem solver capable of generating more detailed 
models. 
The scheme presented here is intended to form 
only part of a comprehensive planning program. 
Although these kinds of qualitative influences are 
not sufficient to resolve true tradeoff's, the tech­
niques described can be useful in planning under 
uncertainty for a variety of reasons. 
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First, the qualitative reasoner can work in tan­
dem with a more traditional planner or decision 
algorithm,. noticing the "obvious" conclusions be­.
fore precise information is supplied. This argu­
ment suggests that a program that rules out "test 
but do not treat" based on a lower numeric ex­
pected utility is missing the poi�t, because the 
conclusion does not depend on the absolute val­
ues of any quantities in the model. Recognition 
of the minimal assumptions necessary for a result 
provides for more coherent and compelling expla­
nations than those generated under complete in­
formation. 
Second, the mechanisms described here may be 
"scaled up" to handle more precise information 
when it is available, with decision-making power 
varying smoothly within the continuum of model 
specification. Expansion of indeterminacy with in­
creased detail can be avoided somewhat by main­
taining the more abstract influences while explor­
ing the more detailed structure. Thus, this work 
is complementary with other recent AI work on 
reasoning with incomplete probabilistic informa­
tion [2,5,8] as well as incomplete utility specifica­
tion [14]. 
Finally, the formalism provides a means for 
exploring probabilistic interpretations of other 
schemes that use qualitative inftuence among un­
certain variables. Work on "causal networks" 
(e.g. CASNET [13]) and Cohen's endorsement ap­
proach [1] fall in this category. 
Further development and integration will but­
tress these arguments. Current work includes ap­
plication of these techniques to analyze and cri­
tique models generated by human decision ana­
lysts [3] .. 
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